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PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF WITNESS LISTS: A
MODEST PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN




Criminal adjudications are increasing in the District of Columbia Superior
Court at an unprecedented rate. While the court has embraced innovative
litigation reduction techniques in the Civil Division, no comparative move-
ment is being made in the Criminal Division. In fact, one recommended
innovation, implementation of sentencing guidelines by the superior court,
may exacerbate crowded criminal dockets.
The superior court is empowered by virtue of its independence and en-
abling authority to promulgate rules of criminal procedure which depart
from the Federal Rules. To address the swiftly rising caseload, adopting
rules that would permit pretrial discovery of witness lists would improve the
administration of criminal justice.
Congress rejected mandatory discovery of witness lists when it amended
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1975. Many states, however,
have found the practice beneficial, because it improves the efficiency and
fairness of criminal justice administration. The superior court adjudicates
common law crimes, and more closely resembles a state court than a federal
court. The District of Columbia courts should therefore depart from the
federal model and join the mainstream of American criminal practice by
broadening pre-trial discovery.
Jurisdictions using broad discovery report higher rates of pleas, higher
rates of conviction after trial, reduced case disposition times, and reduced
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appeals. Experience over the decades has shown that witness tampering and
perjury, often advanced as reasons for denying broad criminal discovery, are
not prevalent problems and, in any event, do not present insurmountable
obstacles.
Pre-plea discovery, like pre-trial discovery, enhances fundamental fairness
by equalizing bargaining positions. This Article proposes that pre-plea dis-
covery will enhance the prevailing standards of competence of defense coun-
sel, lead to more pleas and fewer trials, and improve the administration of
criminal justice in the District of Columbia.
II. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD EXPLOSION
The District of Columbia courts now face the most explosive criminal
caseload growth since court reorganization in 1970.' Popularly tied to the
vast increases in felony drug prosecutions resulting from "Operation Clean
Sweep, '"2 a comprehensive street-level drug law enforcement effort begun in
1986, criminal caseloads have been rising dramatically since 1980. From
1980 to 1985, total criminal case filings jumped 42%.' Felony indictments
in the same period skyrocketed 96%, from 3,138 to 6,160.4 Operation Clean
Sweep only magnified an already pervasive problem. From 1982 to 1988,
criminal filings rose 32%, approximately the same number as those filed in
the five years preceding Operation Clean Sweep.5 The felony filing figures,
however, graphically illustrate how increased drug prosecutions have con-
tributed to the overall problem of court congestion. From 1982 to 1988,
felony charges (pre-indictment filings) increased 111%, while actual indict-
ments rose 147% (from 3,934 in 1982 to 9,709 in 1988).6 Misdemeanors
prosecuted by the United States, traditionally more than twice the total felo-
nies annually, fell to only 53% of the criminal volume in 1988.'
Other divisions of the court system have not witnessed the same caseload
explosion. In the same period (1982-1988), total civil case filings actually
1. In 1970, Congress created the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 1, 5, 18, 20, 40, 42 U.S.C. and 1, 11, 22, 23, 24 D.C. CODE ANN.). See infra notes
22-29 and accompanying text.
2. D.C. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS AND ANALYSIS, DRUG ABUSE AND
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 7, 36 (1987).
3. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 53 (1988) [hereinafter
1987 ANNUAL REPORT].
4. Id.
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declined by 8%, and Family Division case filings rose only 8%.8 The in-
creased case filing figures of the last seven years illustrate that the criminal
caseload, particularly felony cases, has primarily contributed to the overall
caseload increase in the superior court. 9 A comparison of caseload growth
since 1980 and prior to the inception of Operation Clean Sweep in 1986
indicates that felony filings have been growing significantly even without the
recently emphasized enforcement efforts.' °
These pressures, of course, affect the operation of the entire court system,
not just the Criminal Division. Similarly, increased responsibilities in non-
criminal divisions necessarily affect the ability of the Criminal Division to
operate efficiently. For example, court officers pointed out in May 1986,
shortly after the inception of Operation Clean Sweep, that increased child
support enforcement efforts mandated by Congress for the states would "re-
quire substantial reallocation of our resources which, inevitably, will result
in additional pressures upon our Criminal Justice operations."" The court,
in fact, realizes that docket congestion and its related pressures are mainly
caused by the increasingly unmanageable criminal caseload. In support of
increased resources, the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration, the
internal governing authority of the courts, recently told Congress, "[iut ap-
pears that a substantial part of the problem with the District's justice system
is What has been recently labeled 'The Drug Epidemic.' ""2
The expanding criminal docket and shrinking civil docket are likely the
result of determined efforts and not mere happenstance. While the Metro-
politan Police and the United States Attorney's Office embarked on an ambi-
tious prosecutorial effort, the court system was likewise embarking on
ambitious and innovative programs designed to reduce the civil case back-
log. For example, the "Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Program" is a
8. Id.
9. Id. Caseload growth in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has not risen as
dramatically. From 1980 to 1985, criminal appeal filings jumped 24% and total filings were up
31%. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. From 1982 to 1987, however, criminal
appeals remained steady and civil filings actually dropped by 3%. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 23. Large increases in 1985 and 1986 in criminal filings (29% and 36%,
respectively, over 1982), and modest increases in civil filings in the same periods (13% and
11% over 1982), however, did contribute to a 25% increase in case disposition times in 1988
(from 544 days in 1982 to 679 days in 1988). Id. at 24.
10. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 53.
11. Federal Role In D. C Criminal Justice System: Hearings on the Federal-District Rela-
tionship in the Criminal Justice System Before the Subcomm. on Judiciary and Education and
the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia.
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1986) [hereinafter Federal Role in D.C Criminal Justice System]
(statement of Joint Comm. on Judicial Administration).
12. Id. at 88.
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multi-faceted attempt to address rising court congestion and delay.13 From
small claims to domestic relations, civil actions of all kinds are now subject
to mandatory as well as voluntary arbitration. A short-term, high-volume
negotiation session, called "Settlement Week," has taken hundreds of cases
off the docket in a matter of days. 4 Countless others have been forestalled
from filing as a result of alternative dispute resolution strategies. Initially a
limited pilot project of the American Bar Association, local courts seem to
have firmly embraced and enhanced Multi-Door Dispute Resolution.
Special attention has also benefited the civil appellate caseload. According
to recently retired Appeals Court Chief Judge William C. Pryor, in 1986 the
Court of Appeals undertook to emulate the settlement efforts of the trial
court. Some 44% of all civil appeals referred for settlement attempts were
taken off the docket after successful resolution. 5 The legal community has
supported a proposal to create an intermediate appellate court to address
appellate docket congestion and reduce decision delay which Judge Pryor
advocated before a congressional subcommittee in April 1988. 16
In the criminal sphere, the Superior Court Sentencing Guidelines Com-
mission issued an initial report in 1987 for public comment.' 7 Modeled after
recent federal efforts to reduce sentencing disparity and designed to correlate
sentences with "offender history and criminal behavior,"' 8 the proposed
guidelines set out minimum sentencing standards for each offense. The Mi-
nority Report issued with the guidelines, however, contends that overall
sentences will increase and prison overcrowding will worsen.' 9 Such a de-
velopment, if accurate, could foreseeably lead to increased jury trial de-
mands, longer case disposition times, and increased court backlog. The
guidelines have not yet been formally adopted, but are undergoing further
study in light of the Minority Report contentions.
The criminal justice system is obviously not amenable to settlement nego-
tiations and arbitration sessions. But even the casual observer can see that
13. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 (report of Superior Court Chief Judge
Ugast); see also Kessler & Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CATH.
U.L. REV. 577 (1988).
14. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 42-43.
15. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 18 (statement of Chief Judge Pryor).
16. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
17. SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCING COMM'N, THE DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Feb.
1987).
18. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 42 (statement of Chief Judge Ugast).
19. MINORITY REPORT, SUPERIOR COURT SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA I n.1 (Feb. 1987) (Initial Report: The Superior Court Sentencing
Guidelines Commission).
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unchecked growth in the criminal docket under present conditions will
surely strain the court system beyond its capabilities. The Joint Committee
on Judicial Administration recently recognized this and told Congress:
The bottom line is that the District of Columbia's [c]ourts and
its entire justice system face an urgent need for both legislative im-
provements and the necessary resources to expand operations in
order to address the rising case loads and provide greatly needed
services to our community. We stand ready to work with the
Mayor, the Council and the Congress to respond to these needs.2°
The court must also consider innovative approaches to criminal justice
administration. The proposal advanced in this Article, to permit broader
pre-trial discovery in criminal cases, has reportedly improved the adminis-
tration of justice in jurisdictions that have adopted it.21 Reducing the
number of jury trials, case disposition times, and appeals, as well as more
efficiently utilizing judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement resources,
can positively address the concerns outlined by court administrators.
It should not be forgotten that, in 1970, a substantial motive behind court
reorganization was to create a unified court system that would more effec-
tively and efficiently address the growing crime problem in the District
through swift and sure adjudication of criminal cases. While perhaps not
subscribed to by all its supporters, the reorganization bill was reported out of
22 2committee as an "anti-crime" bill. 3
III. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA COURTS
The courts, the Council, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia coex-
ist in a political arrangement unique in the United States. A product of
20. See Federal Role in D.C. Criminal Justice System, supra note 11, at 89.
21. See infra notes 57-62, 94-104, 128-32, 145-53 and accompanying text.
22. HOUSE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT
REFORM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) [hereinafter HOUSE COURT REFORM REPORT].
23. Rep. John McMillen (D-S.C.), as Chairman of the House Committee of the District of
Columbia, reported:
Your Committee is not aware of any period in the Capital's history when crime
was so rampant as now, when . . . courts because of unrealistic philosophies, and
failure to go full speed ahead, have contributed to a major breakdown of law enforce-
ment, and there has been such shocking failure in large part of the machinery of
justice to bring to punishment admitted murderers, rapists and others guilty of aggra-
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congressional action, under its constitutional authority2 4 to legislate all mat-
ters in the nation's capital, the government of the District of Columbia was
designed to relieve Congress of its responsibility to legislate "essentially local
matters."25 Nonetheless, a substantial question exists as to whether the Dis-
trict of Columbia is legally empowered to effect a substantive change in the
court rules of procedure that depart from federal rules without specific con-
gressional action.
Although "self-government" implies more, it is clear that such a rule
change cannot be wrought by the District of Columbia Council, the legisla-
tive body created by Congress to administer the local affairs of the District
and to act as a municipal government. Congressional enabling legislation
specifically prohibits the Council from altering the structure or operation of
the local courts.26 Although initially limited in its power to alter title 23,27
the Council is now permitted to legislate criminal procedure changes, albeit
subject to a more lengthy review period by Congress.28 It may be argued,
however, that Congress' specific language allowing variance from the federal
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, provides in pertinent part: "To exercise exclusive Legis-
lation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may ...become the Seat of the
Government of the United States."
25. By virtue of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorgani-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, tit. I, § 102, 87 Stat. 777 (1973), the D.C. Code provides in
pertinent part: "Subject to the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative authority over
the nation's capital ... the intent of Congress is ... to the greatest extent possible, consistent
with the constitutional mandate, [to] relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essen-
tially local District matters." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-201(a) (1981). The self-government legis-
lation must be considered in tandem with Congress' passage three years earlier of the Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. This bill established local courts and their juris-
diction and consolidated local federal jurisdiction in the United States Courts. See HOUSE
COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 22.
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a) (1981) provides:
The Council shall have no authority to pass any act contrary to the provisions of this
Act except as specifically provided in this Act, or to:
(4) Enact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 (relat-
ing to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Courts); [or]
(8) Enact any act or regulation ...relating to the duties or powers of the United
States Attorney ... for the District of Columbia ....
Id.
27. Id. § 1-233(a)(9). This section prohibited the Council from enacting any legislation
affecting titles 22 (crimes), 23 (criminal procedure), or 24 (treatment of prisoners) during the
first 48 months of the life of the elected Council. Id.
28. Because all legislative authority is ultimately vested in the United States Congress, all
legislation adopted by the District of Columbia Council must pass a 30-day congressional
review period before becoming law. In the case of titles 22, 23, and 24, the review period is 60
days. Id. § 1-233(c)(2).
[Vol. 38:641
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procedural rules29 to accommodate local court procedures enacted in title 23
(criminal procedure) of the D.C. Code, would indeed allow the Council to
effect changes legislatively by revising title 23. This argument, however, at-
tracts few adherents. Most observers agree that if local power to change the
rules exists, it resides in the local courts.
The clear language of the enabling legislation contemplates that rule
changes would occur in both the trial court and the appellate court. Both
courts were granted specific statutory authority to adopt new rules, and to
modify the federal rules put in place by the reorganization legislation.3 °
Congress provided specifically in the court reorganization bill that the local
courts created thereby were constitutional creatures. 3' Concededly, any
rule change by the court, while not demanding affirmative congressional ap-
proval, or even review (unlike acts of the Council), could be rescinded or
modified by Congress. 32 This reality, however, should have no bearing on
whether the court is in fact empowered to promulgate rules that would mod-
ify the federal rules. Language in the conference committee report on the
reorganization legislation clearly contemplated that the court of appeals, not
Congress, would fulfill any such review function: "Section 11-946 requires
the Superior Court to conduct its business according to the Federal rules
unless the court affirmatively prescribes modifications thereof. All modifica-
tions are to be approved before taking effect by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals."
33
Opponents of this interpretation point to House report language on sec-
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1981) provides in pertinent part: "The Superior Court
shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (except as otherwise provided in title 23) unless it prescribes or
adopts rules which modify those Rules." Id.
30. See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (1981). The District of Columbia Code makes it clear that
the trial court and appellate court are courts established pursuant to Article I of the Constitu-
tion (to be distinguished from Article III courts). Id. This was the first clear expression,
statutory or otherwise, indicating exactly where D.C. courts fit in the overall constitutional
scheme. HOUSE COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 22, at 44.
32. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206 (1981) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Congress of the United States
reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature
for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether
within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by this Act,
including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or
after enactment of this Act and any act passed by the Council.
Id.
33. COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT REFORM AND CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE ACT OF 1970, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1970)
(statement of the managers on the part of the House) [hereinafter CONFERENCE COMMriTE
COURT REFORM REPORT].
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tions 11-743 and 11-946 of the legislation which raises the implication that
rule changes could only be adopted if "promulgation of [such rules would]
not be derogatory to the intent of the Federal Rules."' 34 A strict reading of
this language would prohibit any liberalization of discovery contrary to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. The language in question, however,
clearly seems to apply to rule adoptions in "areas where the Federal rules are
either silent or not practical for use by the local courts,",35 and not to all rule
changes. Even more restrictive language, however, is found in the Senate
report:
This section [11-946] states a clear preference for the use of the
Federal rules at both the trial and the appellate levels of the local
court system. Unless there is a particular need for deviation from
the Federal rules because of the peculiar local jurisdiction or be-
cause of the particular exigencies of the local situation, it is ex-
pected that the Federal rules shall be followed.3 6
The restrictive discovery of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 is argua-
bly not practical in a local court, and therefore the peculiar local jurisdiction
over common law crimes justifies deviation. In any case, the conference re-
port language does not track the Senate language. The conference commit-
tee dropped the paragraph quoted above from its report, and what remained
should be accepted as the controlling authority.3 7
In fact, at least one District of Columbia decision ignored the conference
report language and relied instead on the Senate language to find the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure controlling in the local courts. 38 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals found that court reorganization explicitly ap-
plied the Federal Rules and preempted local custom that "conform[ed] as
nearly as may be practicable" to practice under the Federal Rules.39 Reor-
ganization, the court held, repealed the prior local statute4 ° which recog-
34. HOUSE COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 22, at 44.
35. Id.
36. See SENATE COMM. ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT REFORM REPORT AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE COURT REFORM REPORT.] This paragraph is followed by
the exact language that the Conference Committee report eventually adopted. See CONFER-
ENCE COMMITTEE COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 33; see also supra text accompanying
note 33.
37.' CONFERENCE COMMITTEE COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 33, at 225.
38. Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc., 424 A.2d 61, 64 (D.C. 1980). Interpreting the
application of D.C. Civil Rule 3 and whether the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of
limitations in the absence of service of the summons and complaint, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals thought that the Senate report on reorganization reflected a rejection of any
local rule or custom in favor of the Federal Rules, finding the Senate intention "explicit." Id.
39. Id. at 62 (quoting Taylor v. Yellow Cab Co., 53 A.2d 691, 692 (D.C. 1947)).
40. D.C. CODE § 11-756(b) (Supp. 1940).
[Vol. 38:641
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nized local rule or custom. The decision did, however, recognize that the
court rules could be modified.4
Federal law prevents the Supreme Court from promulgating any rules
which "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."42 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals found that law applicable to rulemaking by the
District of Columbia courts, reasoning that Congress would not grant
rulemaking authority to the local courts that it denied to the Supreme
Court.43 In that respect, opponents note that enlarging criminal defendants'
pre-trial discovery rights contravenes federal law and District case law.
This, however, overlooks holdings which declare that criminal defendants
enjoy no fundamental constitutional right to discovery." Especially when
obtained as a condition of providing reciprocal discovery to the prosecutor,
pre-trial discovery by the defendant is not a substantive right, and federal
law does not proscribe its enlargement by the courts.
The arguments that favor local rulemaking authority closely parallel some
of those that favor liberalized discovery. District of Columbia courts are
local, state-level organs close to their subjects of jurisdiction and best suited
to devise rules according to their procedural needs. As pointed out by the
House report: "[H]aving all purely local matters-both civil and criminal-
before a local court system brings the administration of justice closer to the
people who are most personally affected thereby."4
The main impetus behind the court reorganization legislation was the rec-
ognition that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
under modern conditions, was simply unsuited to carry on such "local"
functions as adjudicating common-law felons and deciding automobile acci-
dent claims in excess of $10,000 but otherwise devoid of any federal interest.
By consolidating much of the local jurisdiction of the United States District
Court and the United States Court of Appeals into a purely local court,
Congress acted "to give Washington both a trial and an appellate court com-
parable to those in the States, separate and apart" from the United States
courts.46 Congress explicitly intended to achieve similarity with the states:
41. Varela, 424 A.2d at 64 n.3.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
43. In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335, 343 (D.C. 1976). This juvenile neglect matter involved a
court-made rule governing procedure for terminating parental rights. Finding the rule oper-
ates to abridge substantive parental rights, the court held its promulgation to be beyond the
court's power under D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1981).
44. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 106 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); see also California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
45. HOUSE COURT REFORM REPORT, supra note 22, at 34.
46. Id. at 5.
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"In constituting the lower trial court as a purely local court, similar to a
state court, it follows that appeals from the local court should be treated like
those in the state systems, and that the channel of appeals should be directly
to the United States Supreme Court."' 47 With respect to the administration
of criminal justice, Congress made no specific reservations or qualifications
to maintain the primacy of the "federal interest." To the contrary, the legis-
lative history repeatedly emphasized that "the Superior Court will deal with
all local common law and statutory crimes much the way the States do." 48
To the extent that any local court system enjoys rulemaking and other pow-
ers of self-governance, the District of Columbia courts should possess them
as well.
At least one local federal court has recognized the analogous situation of
state courts and District of Columbia courts.49 Even if a law passed by the
District of Columbia Council is in the final analysis a United States law, the
court reasoned that the fact that it is "authoritatively interpreted, at least at
the local level, not by United States Courts, but by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals," makes it comparable to a state law for purposes of ab-
stention and comity.5" Likewise, the local courts are comparable to their
state counterparts. If District of Columbia laws are entitled to such respect,
it follows that rules promulgated by its courts should be as well.
Congress has followed this analysis recently in granting additional, state-
like powers to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In 1986, Congress
declared that the local appellate court was entitled to answer questions of
local law certified to it by other state high courts, federal appeals courts, and
the Supreme Court.5 Shortly thereafter, Congress removed the superior
court jury system from the supervision of the United States District Court
and empowered the local court to establish its own independent jury selec-
47. Id. at 34-35.
48. Id. at 87.
49. United States Jaycees v. Superior Court, 491 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.D.C. 1980).
50. Id. In a challenge to a Superior Court ruling upholding the District's Human Rights
Act of 1977, 24 D.C. Reg. 6038 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 2551 (1981 & Supp.
1988)), the Jaycees argued that abstention and comity should not preclude the federal court
from enjoining enforcement of the law because District of Columbia courts are not "'state"
courts, therefore, the demands of federalism were not implicated. In rejecting this line of
analysis, the district court relied on legislative history to find itself not in a position to act
because it was only "on a par with other United States District Courts, exercising federal
jurisdiction only." United States Jaycees, 491 F. Supp. at 582 (citing HOUSE COURT REFORM
REPORT, supra note 22, at 34-35).
51. District of Columbia Judicial Efficiency and Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-573, § 7, 100 Stat. 3228, 3232 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723 (Supp. 1988)).
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tion system.52
These measures reinforce the District of Columbia courts' position as self-
governing and autonomous despite their unique relationship to the federal
government. In opposing the application of federal "speedy trial" legislation
to cases in superior court, then-Chief Judge Greene wrote Congress: "Home
rule legislation, the local criminal justice act, and court reorganization all
recognize that Washington, D.C. has interests and problems apart from its
identity as the federal city.... "5 3 The "federal interest" is not so paramount
that it cannot accommodate powers of self-governance delegated to the gov-
ernment of the District of Columbia. Although the District of Columbia is
clearly distinct from the states in a constitutional sense, 54 Congress' exclu-
sive plenary legislative power over the District's affairs allows it to delegate
judicial powers to the District however it sees fit. 55 With this background, it
is not difficult to find an explicit delegation of rulemaking power in D.C.
Code Sections 11-743 and 11-946.
IV. RECENT HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
16: RESTRICTIONS ON DISCOVERY OF GOVERNMENT
WITNESSES
The national debate over a criminal defendant's right to pre-trial discov-
ery has percolated for decades, evidence of the trend toward broadening
such rights incrementally. Serious discussion about further fundamental
change of federal defendants' discovery rights emerged following significant
Supreme Court decisions of the early 1960's which expanded criminal de-
fendants' substantive and procedural rights. A good example is Brady v.
Maryland,5 6 which required prosecutors to reveal exculpatory evidence to
the defendant. The actual promulgation of specific proposals seemed to fol-
low the adoption of broad discovery rights in the state court systems of Flor-
ida in 1968,57 Illinois in 197 1,58 and New Jersey in 1973." 9 Those states had
52. District of Columbia Jury System Act, Pub. L. No. 99-650, § 2, 100 Stat. 3635, 3635
(1986) (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1901 (Supp. 1988)).
53. Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207. H.R. 658, H.R.
687, H.R. 773 and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 761 (1974) [hereinafter Speedy Trial Act Hearings] (statement of
Harold H. Greene, Chief Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia).
54. See Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 447 (1805).
55. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174
U.S. 1, 5 (1899).
56. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
57. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 (enacted by Fla. Supreme Court in 1968).
58. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 412 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (enacted by Ill. Supreme
Court in 1971).
59. N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3 (enacted by N.J. Supreme Court in 1973).
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adopted in large part the proposals for pre-trial procedure the American Bar
Association advocated in a tentative draft published in 1968 and formally
approved in 1970.6' These three states had the experience of California to
study. California case law had established extensive pre-trial discovery
rights for criminal defendants since at least the 1950's,6 and recognized a
defendant's interest in not being confronted with surprise witnesses as early
as 1866.62
The Supreme Court had already significantly broadened discovery for the
federal defendant in 1966. The government's reciprocal right to discover
evidence from a defendant who had used the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to obtain discovery from the United States was also added to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 at that time.63 That expansion was predi-
cated on case law developed by the United States Supreme Court' and
before that in California,6 5 which, in 1966, first recognized reciprocal discov-
ery rights.66
In January 1970, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules 67 distrib-
60. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROJECT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft, 1970) [herein-
after ABA PROJECT].
61. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963) (pre-
trial discovery of government witness identity), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1964); People v.
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956) (production of prosecution witness statements during
trial), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1927) (en-
dorsement of witnesses on indictment).
62. People v. Jocelyn, 29 Cal. 562 (1866).
63. 39 F.R.D. 168, 173 (1966) (proposed Amendments to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16).
64. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding reciprocal alibi notice
statute); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (striking down non-reciprocal alibi notice
statute).
65. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
66. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
67. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, composed of judges, lawyers, and law
professors, is a subcommittee of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Standing Committee assists in carrying out the statutory obligation of the Judicial
Conference to continuously study the operation and effect of rules of practice and procedure in
the courts of the United States, and to recommend appropriate revisions and modifications
from time to time. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). The Conference was authorized by congressional
mandate in the Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982)), and the Conference subsequently authorized the Chief Justice to cre-
ate the Standing Committee. Upon receipt of proposed modifications and solicited comments
from an Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee makes such changes as it desires and
forwards proposed rule changes to the Judicial Conference. After comment and study, the
Conference forwards proposed rule changes to the Supreme Court, which has final authority to
promulgate rule changes and transmit them to Congress for review and approval. Congress
empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of criminal procedure subsequent to verdict
in 1933; authority to make pre-verdict rules was granted in 1940. Rules become effective 90
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uted a first preliminary draft of additional proposed amendments to the
rules.6 8 The proposal included, for the first time, an amendment to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 that would have granted defendants the right
to discover before trial the names and addresses of any witnesses the United
States intended to call at trial during its case-in-chief.69 This proposal repre-
sented perhaps the most significant expansion of federal criminal discovery
in a generation. It was a natural step in the evolution of theories of the
administration of criminal justice and judicial efficiency. The reciprocal dis-
covery right of the government, already a part of the rule, would have ap-
plied to this new provision as well.7° The Standing Committee, however, did
not see fit at that time to formally forward the expanded Rule 16 to the
Judicial Conference for consideration.
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger named a new Advisory Committee on Crim-
inal Rules to continue the work of the prior committee. Chaired by United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Judge J. Edward Lumbard, it
had such distinguished members as Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
William H. Webster (subsequently Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and currently Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Roger Robb, and United States
District Court for the District of Columbia Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. In
addition, the state court systems of California, New Jersey, and Massachu-
setts were represented, as was the United States Department of Justice.7
Reconstituted, the committee proposed substantially the same rule modifi-
cations first circulated in 1970. For the most part, the Judicial Conference
adopted these modifications, and forwarded them to the Supreme Court for
promulgation, which transmitted them to Congress for approval in April
1974.72 Congress responded initially by delaying the effective date of the
rules for one year to allow more time for study.13 Hearings were held in
days after transmittal to Congress unless delayed or modified by legislative action. See gener-
ally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2072 (1982).
68. 48 F.R.D. 547 (1970); see also 52 F.R.D. 409 (1971).
69. 48 F.R.D. at 587 (proposed rule 16(a)(1)(vi)).
70. Id. at 592 (proposed rule 16(b)(1)(iii)).
71. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1974) [hereinafter House Criminal Procedure Hearings] (statement of Judge J. Edward
Lumbard).
72. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 292, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see also 62 F.R.D. 271
(1974).
73. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (1974). The House Judiciary
Committee was presumably preoccupied by the impeachment proceedings against President
Nixon.
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1974, and in 1975 the House of Representatives approved the rules with
some modifications as reported from the Judiciary Committee. 74 Respond-
ing directly to the concerns voiced by the Department of Justice, the only
witness to speak in opposition to the proposed discovery of witness lists, the
committee modified the proposed witness list provision (proposed Rule 16
(a)(1)(vi) and 16 (b)(1)(iii)) to allow discovery only three days prior to
trial. 75 This change conformed the rule to a long-standing federal statute
that allowed discovery of witness lists only in capital cases three days prior
to trial.76 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported a version of the rules
which completely eliminated the witness list provision, but kept most other
modifications intact. That action, ratified by the Senate,77 became the basis
for the version of the rules the conference committee eventually approved.78
Despite the witness list proposal's coverage in testimony and broad support
of the legal community, the conference committee summarily dispatched it
in one paragraph:
A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the
effective administration of criminal justice to require that the gov-
ernment or the defendant be forced to reveal the names and ad-
dresses of its witnesses before trial. Discouragement of witnesses
and improper contacts directed at influencing their testimony, were
deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this policy.
79
Interestingly, despite the bipartisan nature of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee action, four of the five House committee members subsequently ap-
pointed to the ten-member conference committee (Wiggins, Russo, Hyde
and Mann) had signed a minority report denouncing discovery of govern-
ment witness lists.8 0 When joined in conference by Senator McClellan and
Senator Hruska, their endorsement of the House minority report pre-
ordained the fate of the witness list provision.
The debate in Congress over discovery of witness lists pertains to criminal
practice in the District of Columbia courts because the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) apply
in those courts under D.C. Code section 11-946."t Likewise, the Federal
74. H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 674.
75. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 685.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1982).
77. S. CON. REP. No. 336, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975).
78. H.R. CON. REP. No. 414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AIMIN. NEWS 713.
79. Id. at 716.
80. H.R. REI,. No. 247, supra note 74, at 41-42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Ni-ws at 712-13.
81. Section 11-946 of the District of Columbia Code provides:
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Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the appellate court. 2 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that a superior court rule must be
construed in light of the meaning of a corresponding federal rule when they
are substantially identical. 3 As such, the legislative history of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16 directly relates to any discussion of modifying Su-
perior Court Rule 16.84
V. EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AT THE STATE LEVEL: THE
TREND TOWARD DISCLOSURE OF WITNESS LISTS
Although this Article focuses on the desirability of amending local court
rules to allow pre-trial discovery of witness lists, arguments in favor of and
in opposition to broader discovery in general are relevant. Supporters and
detractors have advanced few, if any, new arguments. Basically, supporters
urge that "the ascertainment of truth-the primary purpose of criminal tri-
als-is best achieved by well-informed counsel, not by the surprise tactics of
the sporting theory of justice."8 5 Although opponents frequently cite practi-
cal problems of perjury and intimidation of witnesses, they often share a
philosophical grounding penned decades ago by the venerable Judge
Learned Hand:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense .... Why in addition [the
defendant] should in advance have the whole evidence against him
to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully
The Superior Court shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (except as otherwise pro-
vided in title 23) unless it prescribes or adopts rules which modify those Rules. Rules
which modify the Federal Rules shall be submitted for the approval of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, and they shall not take effect until approved by that
court. The Superior Court may adopt and enforce other rules as it may deem neces-
sary without the approval of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if such rules
do not modify the Federal Rules. The Superior Court may appoint a committee of
lawyers to advise it in the performance of its duties under this section.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-946 (1981); see also supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
82. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-743 (1981). "The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
shall conduct its business according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure unless the
court prescribes or adopts modifications of those Rules." Id.
83. Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 501 (D.C. 1972).
84. The "General Note to the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure," issued by the
Board of Judges of the Superior Court, notes that Rule 16 is substantially identical to its
federal counterpart except for "minor conforming amendments" not pertinent here (deletion
of references to witness lists that were removed from the federal rule in technical amendments
adopted in 1976). See preface to D.C. Sup. CT. R. CRIM. P.
85. Moore, Crimnal Discovery. 19 HAsTINGs L.J. 865, 871 (1968).
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. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the ac-
cused .... What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the
watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecu-
tion of crime.8 6
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has never found a fundamental constitu-
tional right to pre-trial discovery in criminal cases.87 The Court mandates
disclosure by the prosecutor to the defendant of information about the gov-
ernment's case only when that information is exculpatory, or material to
establishing the defendant's innocence.88 Even so, the Court deems a failure
by the government to disclose material exculpatory information in its posses-
sion a constitutional violation only when a reasonable probability exists that,
absent the failure to disclose, the result of the trial (conviction) would have
been different.89
However, despite the Supreme Court's recently affirmed reluctance to ex-
pand the contours of constitutionally mandated discovery, state courts and
legislatures have not so hesitated. The history of discovery in American
criminal jurisprudence reveals a steadily expanding trend from a policy of no
discovery to, in many states today, what is essentially an "open-file" pol-
icy.90 Various needs have been addressed by broad criminal discovery prac-
tices, not the least of which has been court congestion and effective trial
management. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania wrote in 1958, in sup-
port of a criminal defendant's motion for discovery:
It is submitted that more liberal use of discovery in criminal cases
• . . greatly aids in the administration of justice. . . . Under the
present system in civilized communities where counsel is informed
of the real strength of the Commonwealth's case, he is better ena-
bled to give the proper advice to his client and trials are shortened,
issues are met more fairly, guilty pleas are very often made, partic-
ularly in homicide cases, and the administration of justice is not
only speeded up but made more fair and exact.9'
An uncharacteristically frank rendition from a high-level prosecutor, this
86. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (upholding denial of de-
fendant's request to discover grand jury minutes in action to quash indictments for alleged
grand jury irregularity).
87. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); see cases cited supra note 44.
88. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 106 (1976).
89. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
90. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text; infra notes 95-104 and accompanying
text.
91. Brief of Attorney General as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, In re DiJoseph Petition, 394
Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958).
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submission was not written in the days of widespread open discovery, and it
pre-dated Brady by five years. Pennsylvania, however, then and now, re-
mains generally unreceptive to broader pre-trial discovery rights for
defendants.92
One may question whether broader discovery improves the administration
of criminal justice, assuming that such an amorphous concept is capable of
quantification. While increased conviction and lower appeal rates offer some
objective measure of success, there is more to attaining justice than counting
trial days and conviction and appeal rates, and many components are simply
immeasurable. Especially when engaging in comparative analysis, "[g]aps in
the availability of national data"9 3 are often limiting. The numbers seem to
indicate, however, that more pleas are entered and fewer, shorter trials are
conducted when a jurisdiction utilizes broad discovery in criminal cases,94 a
conclusion corroborated by the claims of criminal justice professionals
themselves.
Initially, as more states have moved toward the expansive discovery pos-
ture advocated by the ABA,95 no jurisdiction has turned back. No state has
repealed a broadened discovery scheme or rescinded court rules establishing
it. While the movement toward "open file" discovery has gained much mo-
mentum in the last twenty years, the trend favoring disclosure of witness
lists may appear more dramatic than it actually has been. Many states have
always had statutes requiring the endorsement of witnesses appearing before
an indicting grand jury. In that respect discovery of at least some witnesses
in felony prosecutions has always been possible in many states. What distin-
guishes these states is the extent to which their high courts have seen fit to
enforce the endorsement statutes as a substantive "discovery" right. Al-
lowing a non-endorsed, "surprise" witness to testify at trial would defeat the
statutes' aim unless the defense has had an opportunity to anticipate and
prepare to meet the testimony (by means of a continuance or otherwise).
The majority (nineteen) of states with such statutes have enforced them as a
discovery tool since before the turn of the century.9 6 The reason is simply
92. Commonwealth v. Woodell, 344 Pa. Super. 487, 490, 496 A.2d 1210, 1212 (1985)
(defendant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons to discover
prosecutor's list of witnesses not subject to mandatory discovery under Pennsylvania law).
93. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEI"T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS at iii (1986).
94. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
95. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 60.
96. Arkansas: State v. Johnson, 33 Ark. 174, 175-76 (1878); California: People v.
Jocelyn, 29 Cal. 562, 564 (1866); Colorado: Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440, 445-46, 9 P. 4, 7-8
(1885); Florida: Murray v. State, 25 Fla. 528, 534-35, 6 So. 498, 500 (1889); Georgia: Inman
v. State, 72 Ga. 269, 275-76 (1884); Idaho: State v. Barber, 13 Idaho 65, 86-87, 88 P. 418, 424-
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stated by the Supreme Court of North Dakota:
The practice of indorsing the names of witnesses for the prosecu-
tion upon the indictment or information has long prevailed in this
country and England. The object is to apprise the accused before-
hand of the names of the witnesses against him, to the end that he
may investigate their characters and antecedents and be the better
prepared to meet and overcome or weaken their testimony by
counter testimony gathered in advance of the trial. It is repugnant
to the instincts of justice that an accused should be required to
battle, it may be for his life, in total ignorance of the witnesses by
whose words the state expects to condemn him, and thus necessar-
ily, wholly unprepared to subject them to those tests of accuracy
and credibility so potent in the investigation of truth.97
Four more states, for a total of twenty-three, were enforcing endorsement
statutes by 1939. 9 ' These protections generally require a demand by the
defendant, and where surprise and prejudice can be demonstrated, the de-
fense is usually granted some form of relief which is the functional
equivalent of discovery. Twelve states had endorsement statutes prior to
1900 but, chose not to enforce them in favor of the criminal defendant. 99
25 (1907); Illinois: Gardner v. People, 4 Ill. 83, 89 (1841); Iowa: State v. McComb, 18 Iowa
43, 49 (1864); Kansas: State v. Cook, 30 Kan. 82, 83-85, 1 P. 32, 33-35 (1883); Michigan:
People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 487-88, 12 N.W. 665, 667 (1882); Missouri: State v. Barrington,
198 Mo. 23, 66-71, 95 S.W. 235, 248-50 (1906); Montana: State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 297-
98, 56 P. 364, 365-66 (1899); Nebraska: Carroll v. State, 53 Neb. 431, 436-37, 73 N.W. 939,
940-41 (1898); North Dakota: State v. Kent, 5 N.D. 516, 534-36, 67 N.W. 1052, 1055-56
(1896); Oklahoma: Hyde v. Territory, 8 Okla. 69, 74-75, 56 P. 851, 853 (1899), Colbert v.
State, 4 Okla. Crim. 500, 504-06, 113 P. 558, 560 (1910); Oregon: State v. Warren, 41 Or. 348,
355-56, 69 P. 679, 681-82 (1902); South Dakota: State v. Stevens, I S.D. 480, 481, 47 N.W.
546, 546-47 (1891); Tennessee: State v. Lockett, 50 Tenn. 274, 274-76 (1871); Washington:
State v. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403, 411, 44 P. 889, 892 (1896).
97. State v. Kent, 5 N.D. 516, 534, 67 N.W. 1052, 1055 (1896).
98. Arizona: State v. King, 66 Ariz. 42, 47-49, 182 P.2d 915, 918-19 (1947); Nevada:
State v. Monahan, 50 Nev. 27, 35-36, 249 P. 566, 568-69 (1926); New Mexico: State v.
Rucker, 22 N.M. 275, 282, 161 P. 337, 340 (1916); Texas: Raleigh v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 484,
487, 168 S.W. 1050, 1052 (1914), Jacobs v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 410, 412, 34 S.W. 110, 110
(1896).
99. Alaska: Shelp v. United States, 81 F. 694, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1897) (By congressional
enactment, Alaska was bound by the endorsement statute in use by the State of Oregon, which
enforced its statute to the benefit of the defendant. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
The federal courts in the territory of Alaska, however, interpreted the statute in conformity
with federal cases and denied disclosure to the defendant. Upon achieving statehood, Alaska's
state court followed Oregon and found in favor of the defendant. See Thomas v. Alaska, 391
P.2d 18, 20-21 (1964)); Indiana: Short v. State, 63 Ind. 376, 383 (1878); Kentucky: Common-
wealth v. Glass, 107 Ky. 160, 161-62, 53 S.W. 18, 18-19 (1899); Maine: State v. Wilkinson, 76
Me. 317, 319-21 (1884); Minnesota: State v. Hawks, 56 Minn. 129, 139-41, 57 N.W. 455, 458
(1894); New Hampshire: Lord v. State, 18 N.H. 173, 175-77 (1846); North Carolina: State v.
Hines, 84 N.C. 810, 811-12 (1881); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Emmel, 194 Pa. Super.
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Five of those states have subsequently adopted full pre-trial disclosure.' ° °
Today, twenty-eight states grant the defendant as a matter of right pre-
trial disclosure of the trial witnesses the prosecutor expects to call.' 0 ' Eight
more states require the endorsement of grand jury witnesses and enforce the
requirement as a discovery tool.'1 2 Seven of these thirty-six states require
the listing or endorsement of all witnesses known to the government to have
knowledge of the events in question. 10 3 Sixteen states have adopted some
version of the pre-trial discovery standards, including for-trial witnesses, as
recommended by the ABA.
10 4
Pre-trial disclosure of witness lists is an incremental, but significant step
that should be implemented in the District of Columbia Superior Court.
Broadening discovery in this way would not eliminate defense counsel's
traditional adversarial duty to investigate, but would merely move it out of
cross-examination and closer to the post-incident stage, the time when the
state usually performs its duty to investigate. Disclosure of witness lists is a
discovery device particularly well-suited to the District of Columbia, where
unique jurisdiction prevents other disclosure routinely granted as a matter of
right in many states, including discovery of witness statements, grand jury
testimony, and statements of the defendant to non-agents.
441, 444-47, 168 A.2d 609, 610-12 (1961); Vermont: State v. Norton, 45 Vt. 258, 260 (1872);
Virginia: Shelton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 450, 451-53, 16 S.E. 355, 355-56 (1892); West
Virginia: State v. Enoch, 26 W. Va. 253, 255 (1885); Wyoming: Boulter v. State, 6 Wyo. 66,
74-83, 42 P. 606, 608-11 (1895).
100. Alaska, Indiana, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia. See infra note 101.
101. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(i); ARIZ. R. GRIM. P. 15.1(a)(1); ARK. R. CRIM. P.
17.1(a)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 995a (West 1981) (endorsement); COLO. R. GRIM. P.
16(I)(a)(1)(1); FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i); GA. SUPER. CT. R. 30.3 (1985); IDAHO R.
GRIM. P. 16(b)(6); ILL. ANN. STAT. chap. 38, para. 114-9(a) (Smith-Hurd 1971), ILL. S. CT.
R. 412(a)(i); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-3.1-1-2(c) (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 36-813.2-
5(3) (West 1978), IOWA R. GRIM. P. 5(3); MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-263(b)(1); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.980 (Callaghan Supp. 1988); MINN. R. GRIM. P. 9.01.1(1)(a-c); Miss. R. GRIM. P.
4.06(a)(1); Mo. R. GRIM. P. 25.03(A)(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322(l)(a) (1985); N.J.
R. GRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(a)(7); N.M. R. GRIM. P. 5-501(A)(5); N.D. R. GRIM. P. 16(f)(1); OHIO
R. GRIM. P. 16(B)(1)(e); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815(1) (1973); R.I. R. GRIM. P. 16(a)(6);
UTAH R. GRIM. P. 40); VT. R. GRIM. P. 16(a)(1); WASH. R. GRIM. P. 4.7(a)(l)(i); W. VA. R.
GRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(3)(a) (West 1976).
102. KAN. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-3201(6); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1602 (1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 173.045(2) (1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 384 (West 1967); PA. R.
GRIM. P. 216; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-5-18 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-13-107
(1982); TEX. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 20.20.
103. FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i); IDAHO R. GRIM. P. 16(b)(6); KAN. GRIM. PROC.
CODE § 22-3201(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1602 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 173-045(2)
(1967); N.J. R. GRIM. P. 3:13-3(a)(7); VT. R. GRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
104. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mex-
ico, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
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For example, the Jencks Act,'05 applicable to most prosecutions in supe-
rior court, 10 6 prevents the pre-trial discovery of recorded witness statements.
No amount of judicial discretion can obviate the burden of this federal en-
actment. Any discovery proposal must recognize this essential limitation.
Short of convincing Congress to repeal the Jencks Act,'0 7 or to bar its use in
local District of Columbia criminal prosecutions, 0 8 broader discovery that
enhances investigative possibilities is one way to relieve the Jencks Act's
unique burden on the District of Columbia.
Disclosure of witness lists has never been favored in superior court. Only
one appellate case since court reorganization has addressed the issue, and
that was 13 years ago, in United States v. Holmes. 109 Relying on United
105. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982)), was enacted in 1957 in response to the United States Supreme Court case, Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Jencks involved the federal prosecution of an alleged
Communist for filing a declaration of non-membership in the party pursuant to U.S. labor
laws. The defense requested to see an F.B.I. agent's notes of some investigative activities he
couldn't recall as a witness for the government. The defendant won a reversal of his conviction
from the Supreme Court for being denied access to the potentially impeaching notes. Congress
reacted to fears (magnified in the then-current political climate) of espionage defendants rifling
government intelligence files as a defense tactic. By passing legislation to protect government
witness' notes and statements until trial, Congress effectively made pre-trial investigation of
witnesses themselves even more important.
106. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-101(c) (1981) provides that most adult criminal prosecutions
(except those for violation of police and municipal ordinances or regulations, disorderly con-
duct, serious traffic and minor penal statutes) will be prosecuted in Superior Court "in the
name of the United States by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia or his
assistants." The first line of the Jencks Act reads: "[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by
the United States ...... 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1982).
107. For a convincing argument in favor of just such a proposal, see Rooney & Evans, Let's
Rethink the Jencks Act and Federal Criminal Discovery, 62 A.B.A. J. 1313 (1976).
108. In opposing the operation of the Jencks Act, the California State Bar Committee on
Criminal Law & Procedure said: "Such a restrictive rule places a premium upon the ingenuity,
energy, and agility of defense counsel to formulate a defense strategy in the midst of a jury
trial. Curiously, we deplore that sporting philosophy in the civil litigation practice, when
money and property, not liberty, is at stake." Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.- Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1975) [hereinafter Senate
Criminal Procedure Hearings] (statement of Cal. State Bar Comm. on Criminal Law and
Procedure).
109. 343 A.2d 272 (D.C. 1975). Holmes involved a murder prosecution where the defense
claimed no investigation had been performed in the initial 10 months by previous counsel, and
that three sidewalk eyewitnesses could not be located with the most meticulous investigation.
The defendant was allegedly so intoxicated at the time that he could contribute nothing to the
investigative process. The court found the witnesses' knowledge material to the preparation of
the defense because the witnesses' information was crucial to the State's contention that the
defendant's observed behavior constituted premeditation, an element of the crime charged. Id.
at 278. Because the court perceived no danger of reprisal, it ordered discovery of the govern-
ment's witnesses with protective conditions. Id. at 277.
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States v. Richter, "' the court found it beyond doubt that trial courts have
the inherent power, within their discretion, to order the government to re-
veal its witnesses to the defense."' The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals based its holding on "grounds of fundamental fairness and of
administrative efficiency and order, with the latter helping to effectuate the
former."' 12 Adopting the balancing test the Supreme Court enunciated in
Roviaro v. United States, 13 the court weighed "the public interest in protect-
ing and encouraging witnesses for the government against the individual's
need of the witness or witnesses for the preparation of his defense."" ' 4 After
balancing these interests on a case-by-case basis, however, the bottom line
remains "where the defendant in a criminal case requests the production of
the government's witness list he must make a clear showing of materiality
and reasonableness, as he is required to do under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)."' 1 5
The court of appeals apparently ratified the trial court's formulation that
disclosure should be used only sparingly, and compelled only in "serious
criminal cases on a strong showing of particularized need which substantially




By adhering strictly to the discretionary provisions of the federal rule and
supporting case law, the District of Columbia Superior Court treats local
criminal discovery procedure exactly like its federal counterpart. But
broader discovery recognizes that the bulk of criminal practice is not analo-
gous to federal practice. The District of Columbia, by embracing the federal
model, misses an opportunity to conduct local, common-law criminal litiga-
tion in a manner more consistent with the mainstream of American practice.
The same arguments that apply to federal criminal procedure do not apply
in the District of Columbia. As one District of Columbia Superior Court
chief judge, now a federal district judge, told Congress:
[The Speedy Trial Act should not include our] court system which
is wholly different from the other courts to which this legislation
would apply. Trials for violations of purely federal laws, and the
defendants tried in the federal court system for such violations, as
a rule differ markedly from the trials and the defendants involved
110. 488 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1973).
111. Holmes, 343 A.2d at 278.
112. Id.
113. 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (balancing competing interests before allowing disclosure of
undercover informant's identity).
114. Holmes, 343 A.2d at 277.
115. Id. at 278.
116. Id. at 274 n.5 (emphasis added).
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in the Superior Court process on the basis of charges of common
law crimes. 117
VI. THE INSUBSTANTIALITY OF WITNESS TAMPERING AND PROMOTION
OF PERJURY AS REASONS FOR NONDISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES
The balancing test used by the federal courts when considering requests
for disclosure of government witnesses is weighted at the outset against the
defense, assuming that most, if not all, defendants will attempt to tamper
with named witnesses and that prosecution witnesses are seldom material to
the preparation of the defense.
The most serious objection to disclosure of witness lists is the prospect of
widespread witness tampering. Curiously, only prosecutors seem to raise
this suspicion. Practitioners from jurisdictions with broad discovery, both
local and federal, have downplayed its occurrence."' When Congress con-
sidered the proposed federal rule amendments, only one federal judge (Dis-
trict Judge Blair of Maryland) raised witness lists as a concern in response to
a solicitation of comments from House Judiciary Subcommittee Chairman
William Hungate".9 (now a federal judge himself). The other seventeen re-
sponding judges were more concerned with proposals for changing Rule 11
(pleas) and other controversial ideas ultimately adopted. At least four fed-
eral judges and each of their colleagues in three federal districts explicitly
supported disclosure of witness lists,' 2° as did the bar associations in two
states with limited discovery (Connecticut and Delaware). 121
Before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Department of
Justice presented statements from numerous United States Attorneys attest-
ing to the grave threat of witness intimidation and the potential subornation
of perjury. 122 Their 700 collected examples (often several from one case)
represented the scope of the problem over five years, representing a fraction
of 1% of all criminal filings in that period. 123 Several prosecutors empha-
sized that the bulk of the problem was confined to civil rights, public corrup-
117. See Speedy Trial Act Hearings, supra note 53, at 761.
118. See infra notes 129-31, 134 and accompanying text.
119. HOUSE SURCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., 2D SESS., COMMENTARY: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27-28 (Comm. Print 1974).
120. Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 138.
121. Id. (statement of Richard Thornburgh, U.S. Att'y for W.D. of Pa. and H.M. Ray,
U.S. Att'y for the N.D. of Miss.)
122. See House Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 71, at 87; Senate Criminal Proce-
dure Hearings, supra note 108, at 176 (statement of W. Vincent Rakestraw, Assistant Att'y
Gen. for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
123. Rooney & Evans, supra note 107, at 1315.
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tion,124 white-collar, and organized crime cases.125 More often than not
these incidents involved co-defendants or "confidential" informants.' 26 Be-
cause many informants are either co-defendants, co-conspirators, or at least
confederates, witness secrecy rarely protects informant identities from de-
fendants with whom they have worked. The same can be said of co-defend-
ants. Truly confidential informants are used repeatedly, and moved around
by police if fear of discovery mounts. They rarely appear as actual trial
witnesses and need not be disclosed. In any event, witness tampering would
rarely occur in the vast majority of cases disposed of by plea. 12 7
Several federal prosecutors, not represented at the hearings, already had
adopted so-called "open-file" discovery policies. 128 The United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of California, one of the busiest districts in the
country, reported having disclosed witness lists for years with no untoward
results. 129 An experienced federal defender in San Diego,' 3 ° as well as the
California State Bar, corroborated this experience.' Sifting through the
124. Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 191 (statement of H.M. Ray,
U.S. Att'y for the N.D. of Miss.).
125. House Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 71, at 105 (statement of Richard
Thornburgh, U.S. Att'y for the W.D. of Pa.).
126. See Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 188 (statement of U.S.
Att'y for the N.D. of Iowa). The submission of the United States Attorney for the District of
Kansas, typical for its equivocation and lack of evidence, described how one key witness was
the suspected target of a contract killing: "We did not learn of contract until after name was
disclosed but believe our witness was suspected of being a snitch and contract may have been
previously let." Id. He added, "During past five years there has been only one conviction for
intimidating a witness in this District." Id. The United States Attorney for the District of
Connecticut said that numerous witnesses reported "feeling" intimidated without providing
corroboration. Id. at 179. Even the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia re-
ported only 10 incidents in 13 years. Id.
127. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF
FELONY ARRESTS, 1981, at 7 (Table 4) (1985) [hereinafter STATISTICS II].
128. At least nine United States Attorneys, representing eight states, reported that they
routinely reveal witness identities except in rare cases. Note, Implementing Brady v. Mary-
land: An Argument for a Pretrial Open File Policy, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 889, 909 n.91 (1974).
129. House Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 71, at 109. "[W]e routinely provide
defense counsel with full discovery, including names and addresses of witnesses. We have not
had any untowards [sic] results by following this program, having in mind that the courts will,
and have, excused us from discovery where the circumstances warrant." Id. (statement of
Harry D. Steward, U.S. Att'y).
130. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 74, at 14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 686. Charles Sevilla, chief trial attorney for Federal Defenders of San Di-
ego, Inc., reported: "[Suborned perjury] simply doesn't happen except on the rarest of occa-
sion. When the Government has that fear it can resort to the protective order." Id.
131. Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 110. The California State
Bar's Committee on Criminal Practice and Procedure testified before the Senate:
Liberal criminal discovery in the State Courts of California has worked well and
without a break-down in the search for truth in the criminal justice system for nearly
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voluminous and contradictory testimony, the House Judiciary report
concluded:
The Committee recognizes that there may be a risk but believes
that the risk is not as great as some fear that it is. Numerous states
require the prosecutor to provide the defendant with a list of prose-
cution witnesses prior to trial. The evidence before the Committee
indicates that these states have not experienced unusual problems
of witness intimidation.
... Prosecutors are willing to determine on their own when they
can [open their files] without jeopardizing the safety of witnesses.
There is no reason why a judicial officer cannot exercise the same
discretion in the public interest. 132
Permitting discovery of witness lists in the District of Columbia Superior
Court would simply shift the presumption to favor disclosure. It would not
prevent the court from protecting witness identity in appropriate cases. Ex-
perience of several decades has demonstrated that witness tampering associ-
ated with organized crime, labor, and public corruption simply is not the
norm in common law criminal prosecutions of the type conducted in supe-
rior court.' 3 3 Thirty-six state court systems now reveal witness identity in
some fashion. None has repealed its laws in the face of insurmountable
problems. Subcommittee Chairman William Hungate, testifying on behalf
of the amendments before the Senate, concluded that:
Intimidation of witnesses.., does not arise in every Federal crimi-
nal case or even in a majority of them. Rather, it occurs in a small
percentage of cases ....
... Exceptional situations, if they are significant enough, should
be provided for, but they should not be a basis for doing away with
the general rule. Just because it rains 10% of the time doesn't
mean I should always wear a raincoat."'
a generation. In view of California's polyglot population and its diversity of urban
and rural settings . . . California's experience with liberal criminal discovery would
seem to have provided the Congress with a valid laboratory test of full-blown crimi-
nal discovery.
Id.
132. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 74, at 13-14, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 685-86 (footnote omitted).
133. See supra text accompanying note 117.
134. Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 137. In the same vein,
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan wrote:
[N]o one suggests that discovery in criminal cases should be at large and without the
intervention of judicial discretion .... Dangers and other abuses . . . are clearly a
matter of legitimate concern - they argue however not for wholesale prohibition of
criminal discovery but only for circumspection and for appropriate sanctions tailored
to dealing with apprehended abuses in the particular case.
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The second main argument against broadening defense discovery is the
fear that defendants will "tailor" their defense to meet the prosecutor's case,
committing perjury or worse. No commentator, however, has convincingly
supported any distinction between civil and criminal defendants that suppos-
edly makes this a problem unique to criminal cases. On the contrary, many
prosecutors, including those in the Tax Division of the Department of Jus-
tice, concede that they have experienced problems in white-collar criminal
cases.135 Civil litigants, with huge sums of money and reputations at stake,
are hardly less prone to deception. Fraud, deception, unfulfilled promises
and the like often form the basis for civil claims, but practitioners are in-
clined to believe that the broad, open discovery used in civil practice3 6 fore-
stalls perjury. Like claims of witness intimidation, the perjury argument
assumes the worst about a majority of defendants and punishes all, when in
truth, few present a problem. As Dean Wigmore remarked:
The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an oppor-
tunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the hon-
est accused a fair means of clearing himself. That argument is
outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time
refusal of the criminal law ... to allow the accused to produce any
witnesses at all.' 
37
Both objections, fear of intimidation and perjury, seriously undermine the
presumption of innocence and roundly defame the entire defense bar by as-
suming their cooperation in such schemes.' 3 ' The objections disregard
equally the effectiveness of bar disciplinary structures and the courts in deal-
ing with these problems if they arise.
Former United States Attorney James R. Thompson (now Governor of
Illinois) rejected this perceived attack on the presumption of innocence and
defended traditional discovery. Declaring that the defendant enjoys the ad-
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q.
279, 292.
135. House Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 71, at 48.
136. Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132
(1951).
Facilitation of perjury has been a bogey man of discovery for over a hundred years.
No evidence can be produced conclusively to prove or disprove it, and the consensus
among lawyers is to reject it. This investigation disclosed the variety of ways in
which lawyers use discovery to thwart perjury.
Id. at 1154 (footnotes omitted).
137. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 488 (3d ed. 1940).
138. Justice Brennan remarked: "To shackle counsel so that he cannot effectively seek out
the truth and afford the accused the representation which is not his privilege but his absolute
right seems seriously to imperil the bedrock presumption of innocence." Brennan, supra note
134, at 287.
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vantage at every stage of the criminal case except perhaps at time of indict-
ment, Thompson defended the trial's protection of a defendant's presumed
innocence: "[I]f the new rules are destined to try to change a balance which
may be envisioned to be to the advantage of the prosecutor, that supposed
balance is only a vision.""' Thompson's analysis glosses over the pre-trial
stage and fails to admit the overwhelming investigatory advantage enjoyed
by the State. The prosecutor obtains significant pre-trial discovery through
ex parte use of the grand jury and its compulsory process, use immunity
statutes to compel testimony, and also enjoys a monopoly on sophisticated
and comprehensive investigative agencies. 140 Government investigators usu-
ally have access to the scene and physical evidence before anything changes,
and to witnesses before memories lapse or they leave the area.' 4 ' Often the
defendant himself reveals much during custodial interrogation.' 42 Revealing
witness lists would merely broaden investigatory avenues open to enterpris-
ing counsel and afford the defense some minimal measure of parity in the
pre-trial stage.
The arguments in favor of broader pre-trial discovery are no fresher today
but are corroborated by several decades of experience in the states. While
declining to mandate broad disclosure as a constitutional right, the United
States Supreme Court has certainly encouraged its use. '43 According to sup-
porters, broad discovery allows for adequate pre-plea investigation and pre-
trial cross-examination preparation and the development of impeachment
evidence, it reduces or eliminates mid-trial delay, and it facilitates the plea
139. House Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 71, at 144-45.
140. Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases. The Concept of Mutuality and the Need for
Reform, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 441, 450-51 (1969).
141. Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1019
(1972).
142. Katz, supra note 140, at 451; see also Brennan, supra note 134, at 292 (arguing that
the "innumerable" cases that come before the Supreme Court alleging police violations of the
interrogation process suggest that the fifth amendment is not the barrier to reciprocal discov-
ery that many prosecutors claim. "Success very frequently crowns the [interrogation] effort, if
the proportion of guilty pleas and convictions resting upon confessions affords a reliable
guide.").
143. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) ("The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive." The court that issued
the Nixon decision is, incidentally, the same court that proposed the rule change under discus-
sion.); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973) ("Indeed, the State's inherent infor-
mation-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it
should work in the defendant's favor."); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970) ("The
adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game ...."); Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("A criminal trial is not a game in
which the State's function is to outwit and entrap its quarry."); see, e.g., Cicenia v. Lagay. 357
U.S. 504 (1958) (prosecutor's disclosure of defendant's statement the better practice).
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process. "' In short, disclosure of witness lists enhances fairness and the
search for truth.
VII. MEASURING IMPROVED ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
Generally, claims of improved administration of justice resulting from
broader discovery are not susceptible to ready quantification. Comparative
statistics are not readily available, and those that exist are inconsistent. Dif-
ferent court systems compile their data bases at different criminal case
processing points, and not all jurisdictions use equivalent definitions in the
criminal process. What may be indicted as a felony in one jurisdiction may
be prosecuted as a misdemeanor in Washington, D.C., and vice versa.
Available statistics do not account for personnel constraints, such as the
number of courts and prosecutors available. With these limitations in mind,
this section will attempt to make a brief statistical comparison between the
city of San Diego, California, which uses broad discovery, and the city of
Washington, D.C., which uses limited discovery.
These two cities were selected because, among other things, the source
statistics include these two urban jurisdictions together in more comparative
tables than most other pairs of cities. 14 5 More importantly, both jurisdic-
tions have similar arrest screening rates, San Diego eventually indicting 29%
of all felony arrestees and Washington eventually indicting 32% of all felony
arrestees (out of thirteen cities, only Lansing, Michigan, at 30%, was closer
to Washington in this respect).' 46 Similar prosecution ratios allow a better
comparison of actual disposition rates of indicted cases without being
skewed by judicial dismissals. The closeness of these statistics may also
demonstrate the relatively similar prosecutive priorities of the two cities.
With the inherent limitations of these comparisons in mind, it appears
that broader discovery practices contribute to more effective and efficient
adjudications. In San Diego, 86% of indicted felonies result in guilty pleas,
compared to only 66% in Washington.147 In Washington, only 57% of the
felony pleas are to the top charge (most serious) in the indictment.' 48 San
144. See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 74, at 13-15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 685-87.
145. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF
FELONY ARRESTS, 1980 (1985) [hereinafter STATISTICS I]; STATISTICS II, supra note 127.
146. STATISTICS II, supra note 127, at 7 (Table 5).
147. Id. at 7 (Table 4).
148. STATISTICS I, supra note 145, at 21 (Exhibit 21).
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Diego defendants plead to the top charge 75% of the time.' 49
While 19% of indicted felonies go to trial in Washington, nearly three
times the San Diego rate (7%), Washington prosecutors win convictions in
only 72% of their trials. 5 ' San Diego prosecutors win 84% of their trials
(perhaps as a result of trying significantly fewer cases than their District of
Columbia counterparts)."'5 Finally, the median felony trial disposition time
in San Diego is 204 days.' 5 2 In Washington, the median felony trial disposi-
tion time is 303 days, 50% higher than San Diego.'
53
While the results may not be solely attributable to broad criminal discov-
ery, these statistics suggest that, when measured by objective criteria such as
trial time, successful prosecutions, and number of guilty pleas, criminal jus-
tice is more efficiently dispensed under San Diego's broad discovery scheme
than under the federal model applied by District of Columbia courts. At a
minimum, this also suggests that any fear that broad criminal discovery will
unfairly tilt the playing field in favor of the criminal defendant is unfounded.
In addition, broad discovery contributes to attainment of other objectives of
the criminal justice system. In particular, broad discovery ensures that
criminal defendants can receive zealous and competent representation of
counsel, especially at the pre-plea stage where the need for effective assist-
ance is too often ignored.
VIII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY AND
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Viewing discovery practices solely in the context of the trial proceedings
does not account for the vast majority of criminal cases, which are disposed
of by guilty pleas.'5 4 Many of a defendant's constitutional rights that a trial
is designed to vindicate are surrendered in the guilty plea process. But
should that include the surrender of aggressive fact investigation by compe-
tent counsel? Commentators who do not oppose some form of pretrial dis-
covery nevertheless opine that pre-plea discovery would jeopardize the
149. Id.
150. STATISTICS II, supra note 127, at 7 (Table 4).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 33 (Table 28).
153. Id.
154. As with all statistical analyses of American criminal justice, reliable raw numbers are
difficult to compile and/or analyze except in the unified federal system. Otherwise, data is
collected and presented nearly 50 different ways among the states. Despite this inherent limi-
tation, the American Bar Association estimated that as many as 90-95% of all criminal cases
are disposed of by guilty pleas in some jurisdictions. STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY 1, 2 (Approved Draft 1968). The number of felony prosecutions ended by plea in
Washington, D.C. is much lower; about 66%. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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state's ability to secure pleas. Flannery suggests that "guilty defendants"
would use pre-plea discovery to "turn up something which would enable
them to win an acquittal .... Others have questioned the "necessity" of
discovery in the pre-plea stage. " 6 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
the defendant's dilemma, 5 7 but has failed to cure it.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the tradeoff nature of plea
bargaining. Defendants who plead guilty simply have no right to confront
the witnesses, demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt, invoke compulsory
process on their behalf, or, perhaps most important, remain silent to protect
themselves against self-incrimination.'1 8 As long as a court obtains an "in-
telligent and competent waiver" of these constitutional rights' 59 in accepting
a guilty plea, the prosecution will be relieved of its responsibilities concern-
ing the defendant's rights that arise in the trial context, including discovery.
Defendants pleading guilty surrender any adversarial posture-the very
foundation of criminal trials in the United States- 60 when they fail to put
the prosecution to its proof.
Denying pre-plea discovery ignores the reality that many, if not most,
guilty pleas are entered at the conclusion of the pre-trial stage, that is, on the
verge of trial.' 6' The adversary process should not begin only when jury
empanelment commences. Throughout this pre-trial stage a defendant re-
tains the fifth amendment guarantee of due process and the sixth amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel. 162  Similarly, throughout this
stage there exists a heavy professional responsibility on defense counsel to
investigate the case and evaluate a defendant's options. 163  Indeed, the
155. See, e.g., Flannery, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 78 (1963).
156. Hoffman, Prosecutor's Position: Arguments and Illustrations Against Liberalization of
Defense Discovery Rules; Need for Prosecutor's Discovery of Specific Defenses, What Next in
Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 16 (1964).
157. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1969).
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making
of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless wit-
nesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even the truth will often be in
dispute. In the face of unavoidable certainty, the defendant and his counsel must
make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case .... [A] decision to
plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers, uncertain as they may be.
Id. at 769-770; see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 559, 561 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
159. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
160. "We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the
parties contest all issues before a court of law." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709
(1974).
161. STATISTICS 1I, supra note 127, at 33 (Table 28).
162. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 nn.5-7, 757 (1970).
163. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUTIsiCE § 4-4.1 (Approved Draft
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United States Supreme Court has explicitly relied on the effectiveness (or
presumed effectiveness) of defense counsel in validating the practice of de-
fendants' weighing their options and voluntarily entering guilty pleas.
164
The standard for effectiveness, however, is not modeled on the idealistic
ABA standards, but is defined by the low end of an average common denom-
inator: what can be expected from counsel within the range of reasonable
levels of competence. 165 The analysis of a lawyer's competence is not per-
formance geared, but rather is result oriented. The prevailing inquiry is
whether the result of the proceeding (conviction) would have been different,
absent counsel's less-than-average performance. 166 Because courts require a
defendant pleading guilty to admit to the existence of a factual basis for the
plea 167 and to forego proof beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel's fact investi-
gation rarely, if ever, comes under scrutiny. Retrospective review of the ef-
fectiveness of counsel prior to plea proceedings is nearly impossible' 68 and
1986 Supp.) (imposing a duty to fully investigate every client's case). In commentary explain-
ing this standard, the ABA writes:
Facts form the basis of effective representation.
• . . Apart from any formal processes of discovery that are available, prosecutors
and law enforcement officers have in their possession facts that defense counsel must
know.
•.. The basis for evaluation of these possibilities will be determined by the lawyer's
factual investigation, for which the accused's own conclusions are not a substitute.
The lawyer's duty is to determine, from knowledge of all the facts and applicable
law, whether the prosecution can establish guilt in law, not in some moral sense.
Id. § 4.54-.55.
164. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 ("[N]or is there evidence that Brady ... could not,
with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advan-
tages of pleading guilty."); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) ("[D]efendants
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel."); Van
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) ("[A]n accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel
to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved
and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered."). The right to
effective assistance of counsel is one of the few constitutional rights not surrendered by the
guilty pleading defendant. See also Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant:
Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy. 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981).
165. The quality of legal advice to a defendant pleading guilty is not judged "on whether a
court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Mc-
Mann, 397 U.S. at 771.
166. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
167. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). But cf North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (plea of nolo contendere).
168. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (upholding counseled plea to mur-
der, stating: "[Ilt is likewise not sufficient that he show that if counsel had pursued a certain
factual inquiry such a pursuit would have uncovered a possible constitutional infirmity in the
proceedings."); see also McMann, 397 U.S. at 769-70 (The court found that in a plea situation
"[a]ll the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined." The de-
fendant must rely on advice, "uncertain as [it] may be.").
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rarely effective.
The notion that defendants and the State derive mutual benefits persists in
cases upholding plea bargaining and its attendant practices. Under this ide-
alized view, an obviously (or not) guilty defendant admits guilt and surren-
ders trial rights in exchange (implicit or not) for charging concessions and/
or sentencing recommendations. The court saves the time and expense of a
trial, and the prosecutor quietly steps back, having again avoided, often at
his instigation, being put to the proof. The parties "come to the table" and
mutually bargain for a just or achievable resolution between adversaries. In
jurisdictions with limited discovery, information critical to an accurate as-
sessment of the strength of the government's case, which must inform any
decision by defendant's counsel on whether to accept a plea bargain offer,
lies solely in the possession of the government. This calculated use of supe-
rior bargaining information increases the risk that "a defendant would plead
guilty because he was erroneously convinced that the prosecution had a
strong case against him."' 6 9 Conversely, a defendant, ignorant of the state's
case and thereby erroneously convinced of the strength of his own case, is
less likely to plead guilty when, in fact, he should. After receiving necessar-
ily uncertain advice from counsel, who is perhaps familiar with only some of
the pertinent facts, an under-informed defendant may demand an unneces-
sary trial. Either result subverts the adversarial character of government/
defendant encounters contemplated by our system of criminal justice.
Many citizens are unsympathetic to defendants who plead guilty, and are
often opposed to plea bargaining altogether. '70 Perceiving beleaguered pros-
ecutors strapped with impossibly high caseloads, harried judges confronted
with defense counsels' dilatory tactics, and dockets bursting at the seams,
the public often views the defendant as having the advantage throughout the
entire criminal justice process. 7 ' These perceptions disregard the presump-
tion of innocence,' 7 2 and are simply not well-founded by what little we do
169. Comment, Preplea Discovery. Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 531 (1971).
170. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE FINAL REPORT 46-48 (1973) (The Commission, a grant-funded project of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration ("LEAA"), brought criminal justice professionals to-
gether from across the nation. It was convened and presided over by LEAA Administrator
Jerris Leonard, most recently impeachment and defense counsel to former Arizona Governor
Evan Mecham. Leonard apparently did not subscribe to the conclusion of the Commission as
he engaged in spirited but fruitless plea bargaining with the Attorney General of Arizona on
behalf of Governor Mecham. Mecham was eventually acquitted of criminal charges following
his impeachment and removal from office by the Arizona legislature.).
171. See Senate Criminal Procedure Hearings, supra note 108, at 174 (testimony of U.S.
Att'y Paul Curran for the S.D. of N.Y.).
172. See supra note 138.
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know about prosecutorial practices and court congestion.
Studies that have attempted to quantify the motives behind plea bargain-
ing and its effects, while approached from different perspectives, have largely
reached the same conclusions: plea bargaining is not the result of court con-
gestion and it does not represent the last stand of overworked prosecutors.
A long-term look at Connecticut superior courts, conducted by Heumann,
showed consistent trial rates between high-volume and low-volume courts as
a percentage of cases disposed. "The mean percentage trial to total disposi-
tion over this 75-year period is 8.7% .... [F]rom 1910 to 1954 it reached the
10% mark only three times."' 7 3 Heumann evaluated nine Connecticut
court divisions and examined the three highest-volume and three lowest-vol-
ume divisions. Although not controlled for such variables as number of
judges and prosecutors in the respective divisions, the study found that "de-
spite the large difference in actual case volume which was used to dichoto-
mize the two groupings, trial rates between them varied minimally, and
indeed often the low volume courts tried proportionally fewer cases."'
174
Heumann concluded that "[t]he notion that plea bargaining and case pres-
sure 'go together' must be reexamined .... It should now be evident that
guilty pleas will be proffered and accepted for reasons other than case
pressure." 17
5
A more sophisticated study of criminal case disposition practices in Chi-
cago, Baltimore, and Detroit, conducted by Eisenstein and Jacob, validated
Heumann's conclusion. By analyzing courtroom "workgroups" in three ma-
jor urban cities, Eisenstein and Jacob also found that caseload pressure does
not necessarily result in plea bargains. 176 The "workgroup" analytical
model allowed the researchers to control for the number of judges, court
personnel, and prosecutors assigned to a particular load, and they concluded
that:
Many observers of criminal courts allege that courts use guilty
pleas resulting from plea bargains because of their heavy case load.
Our data do not support that contention. Baltimore courtrooms
- which disposed only one-third of their cases by guilty pleas -
had 671 defendants per courtroom on the average in 1972. Chi-
cago courtrooms - which used guilty pleas twice as often - had
307 defendants per courtroom. Detroit, with the same guilty plea
rate as Chicago, had the heaviest courtroom work load: 735 de-
173. Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 515, 520
(1975).
174. Id. at 521-22.
175. Id. at 527.
176. J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS 238-39 (1977).
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fendants per courtroom. These data indicate that there is no clear
relationship between courtroom work load and use of guilty
pleas. 177
Other research indicates that defendants are not receiving unjustified re-
wards because of an overburdened adjudication system, and also suggests
that unmanageable prosecutorial workloads do not result in overly generous
plea offers. Knudten designed a study to examine prosecutors' reasons for
bargaining.' 78 Identifying four variables (legal problems, "overcriminaliza-
tion," case pressures, and the need to individualize justice) in a survey of 140
elected county prosecutors in Wisconsin and Michigan, seventy-one re-
turned questionnaires validating the following conclusions:
The reasons Wisconsin and Michigan prosecutors give as impor-
tant for plea bargaining group themselves into patterns that con-
form to those cited in the literature. The most important reason
cited is that there are legal problems with a case ....
Different types of prosecutors vary on the reasons they indicate
are important. No one single type emphasizes legal problems.
This highlights the universality of this reason....
The only reason which is associated with actual plea bargaining
at a statistically significant level is legal problems.' 79
These studies suggest that, contrary to the popular wisdom, the benefits de-
rived from plea bargaining may not be so mutual as the prevailing wisdom
suggests. When used as the justification for depriving the guilty pleading
defendant of important procedural rights, it is important not to lose sight of
our ultimate goal: justice, not just convictions.
If a poor government case motivates plea negotiations, no principled rea-
son exists to keep defense counsel in the dark about that fact. If a defendant
can be bluffed into pleading to a charge more serious than the state could
ultimately prove at trial, the system has exploited its superior bargaining
position to the detriment of overall justice. Allowing defendants a greater
opportunity to discover the strength of the state's case will lead to better
informed pleas and fewer justice defeating bluffs with no appreciable loss to
the state of its ability to justly prosecute and punish criminals.
If in plea proceedings, according to the Supreme Court, effective assist-
ance of counsel does not encompass comprehensive fact investigation and
constitutes waiver of the law's demand for strict proof, some may question
why pre-plea discovery be broadened when discovery itself is not even a con-
177. Id. (footnotes omitted).
178. Knudten, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining. Reasons Related to Actions, in
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 286-87 (R. Rich ed. 1978).
179. Id.
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stitutional right. Essentially the same reasons that support pre-trial discov-
ery justify pre-plea discovery: the search for truth, the prevention of
injustice, notions of fair play, and fundamentally, the improved administra-
tion of justice.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress and the courts have displayed an historical reluctance to em-
brace broader pre-trial discovery in criminal cases in the District of Colum-
bia primarily as a result of the jurisdiction's relationship to the Federal
Government and its reliance on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The local courts, however, are responsible for their own destiny and should
be free to devise adjudication models appropriate to their unique needs and
commensurate with their resources.
It is simply unjustified for the local courts to treat this jurisdiction as a
mere appendage of the National Government. This is a federal city, but one
that is largely self-governing and that provides state-level, county-level, and
municipal-level services to its citizens and visitors. The local court has a
responsibility for self-governance, and should not rely exclusively on a fed-
eral model that does not serve the needs of a state-level court system.
Broadening pre-trial discovery of witness lists in criminal cases by means
of a court-inspired amendment to the local rules is an incremental, innova-
tive step that should be taken to address the fastest-growing criminal
caseload since court reorganization. In addition to consistently pleading to
Congress for increased resources, the District of Columbia Superior Court
Board of Judges should exercise responsible leadership by promulgating
amendments to the court rules that will bring this state-level jurisdiction into
the mainstream of American criminal practice. Broader discovery has
worked well in the many states that have implemented it, improving the
administration of criminal justice, enhancing standards of lawyer compe-
tence, and avoiding the untoward results predicted by many prosecutors.
Broad discovery should similarly work well in the District of Columbia.
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